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Introduction
 With the purpose of expanding within the international community, 
the People’s Republic of China began in the Mao Tse-Tung Era (1949-1976) 
to develop a policy of internationalization and thus to seek to win the sympa-
thy of Third World countries, supporting the anti-imperialist movements of 
Eastern Europe and the African Continent (Kynge 2006; Cooley 1965). The 
development aid policy was drawn up and implemented after the Bandung 
Conference in Indonesia in April 1955, bringing together Heads of State and 
Government and delegates from 29 Asian and African States, with the main 
goal of fostering economic cooperation and Afro-Asian culture. At that meet-
ing, China intended to stand out in relation to the hegemony of the United 
States of America (USA) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR).
Since the 1960s, the African continent has been one of the largest 
beneficiaries of the development aid policy, since several programs, projects 
and actions have already been implemented in a wide range of sectors. Cape 
Verde is not an exception in so far as it has benefited from this aid. The Cape 
Verde-China cooperation goes back to the beginnings of the national libera-
tion struggle, and this relationship was only formalized in April 1976. The 
cooperation in the field of infrastructure should be stressed. Among several 
constructions financed by China one can point out: The National Assembly, 
the Government Palace, the National Auditorium, the National Library, the 
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Jorge Barbosa Auditorium, the Amílcar Cabral Memorial, the Poilão Dam, 
the National Stadium, Maternity and the Consultation Center of the Agost-
inho Neto Hospital and other emblematic works located in the capital of the 
country.
As the forty-first anniversary (1976-2017) of the economic, trade and 
cultural cooperation between Cape Verde and the People’s Republic of China 
is being celebrated, it is urgent to think of the guidelines for this relation-
ship, as well as the challenges that such cooperation imposes, particularly 
for the archipelago which, throughout its history, has survived thanks to the 
development of programs of public aid for development channeled through 
donations and concessional loans.
The main objective of this article is to analyze and discuss the bilater-
al cooperation between Cape Verde-China, focusing on the main guidelines 
of this relationship, taking into account the geographic, political, economic 
and cultural characteristics of the archipelago. To this end, the question is: 
what is the place it has occupied within the framework of the Sino-African 
partnerships? Is China’s interest in the archipelago related to the fact that it 
presents itself as potentially favorable and serves as a continental platform for 
insertion into the African market? From the existing agreements, what have 
been the concrete results of this cooperation?
It is believed that, in order to meet the challenge of development, Cape 
Verde should focus on strengthening cooperation, mainly with those whose 
results contribute to its projection and which translate into comparative ad-
vantages in the international arena. Considering that there are few scien-
tific productions that problematize Cape Verde-China cooperation, we seek 
through an interdisciplinary reading, to adopt a methodology that prioritizes 
the triangulation of information and data obtained from a critical view on the 
different existing theories and, thus making room for the use of differentiated 
perspectives, making available to politicians, academics, entrepreneurs and 
citizens a contribution considered useful for the public interest.
The Dragon in Africa: Strategic Axes of the Sino-African 
Relationship
Because it is a continent that has grown the most in the last decades 
and where the return of foreign investment is one of the highest in the world, 
it arouses the interest of different powers that seek it with the intention of 
penetrating a market of millions of consumers (Jackson 2004). China has 
sought to focus its attention on areas with growth potential such as education, 
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health, construction, financial services, consumer goods and telecommuni-
cations, thus taking a leading position, seeking to transform and develop the 
continent (Michel 2008).
With the intensification of trade relations with several countries in the 
world, China has achieved high rates of economic growth, facilitating its in-
sertion in the international arena (Brautigam 2008). The significant increase 
in trade relations made China one of the main partners of the African conti-
nent, surpassing the commercial volume of France and Great Britain, losing 
only to the United States of America. With 70% of total trade with Africa, 
China leads among countries like Brazil, Russia and India (Kabunda 2011). 
In fact, African countries sustain much of China’s demand for natural and 
energy resources. Angola accounts for more than half of the oil imports. Sim-
ilarly, countries such as Cameroon, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan are 
important partners in China whereas considering the import of crude oil and 
its by-products. In addition, China imports gold from Burundi and Tanzania; 
non-ferrous metals (aluminum, bronze, copper, brass and zinc) from South 
Africa, Botswana and Zambia; textile fibers from Burkina Faso and Burundi; 
coffee and tea from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda; tobacco from Zimbabwe 
and Malawi and textiles from Morocco and Tunisia.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the region of Sub-Sa-
haran Africa accounted for an economic growth around 5%, which had only 
been recorded in the 1960s. This points to the importance of continuously 
strengthening economic and trade relations between China and other African 
countries (Gonçalves 2010). In order to have a clearer picture of Chinese in-
vestment in the African continent, it is worth highlighting that from US$ 911 
million invested in 2000, it increased to US$ 68 billion in 2010, particularly 
in South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Nigeria, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Republic of Niger, Sudan and Zambia (Kobylinski 2012).
Sino-African relations that have been modernized over time have been 
established for more than a century, since most of them began with the strug-
gle for independence of African nations (Eisenman 2015). It is important to 
underline the main moments that marked these relations:
In 1993 a plan was drawn up by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Chi-
nese Economic Cooperation to explore African countries markets. In 1995, the 
Chinese Government made several visits to this continent, and the National 
Working Conference on Reforming Assistance to Foreign Countries (Keijzer, 
1992; Snow, 1988) was held this year in Beijing. This meeting allowed the 
creation in 1996 of ten centers for investment and trade in African countries 
(Manji and Marks, 2007). In 1997, the Chinese enterprises, which began this 
process of investment and dynamism of the economy of the continent, con-
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vened a Conference to discuss economic and trade cooperation with Africa in 
partnership with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation to 
rethink the aid measures to the Chinese entrepreneurs who wanted to invest 
in the continent (Naidu 2007).
From this date, it was decided that seminars on economic and finan-
cial management would be held twice a year, bearing in mind the importance 
of strengthening Sino-African relations, in fact making them worthwhile.
In October 2000, the First China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) 
was held in Beijing, in which the Chinese government decided to reduce or 
even forgive debts of African countries amounting to US $ 1.2 billion. In ad-
dition, it was decided that China would increase considerably in its external 
relations, a portion of assistance to the African continent (Hong-Ming 2004). 
FOCAC was attended by Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Prime Minister 
Zhu Rongji and Vice President Hu Jintao, senior government representatives 
from 44 African countries and 17 regional and international organizations, 
particularly the presence of the Secretary- General of the African Union (AU). 
In addition to deciding that the Chinese government would forgive and re-
duce debts, two documents were approved that established the guidelines for 
the China-Africa relationship. The first relates to the Beijing Declaration and 
the second to the Sino-African Cooperation Program for Economic and Social 
Development.
For the last fifteen years, FOCAC has been taking place in a triennial 
frequency. The host has been alternately China and an African country. In 
December 2003, the Plan of Action for 2004-2006 was approved in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia.
The III FOCAC was held in Beijing in 2006, where it was decided 
to create the China-Africa Development Fund (CAD Fund), which sought to 
stimulate and facilitate Chinese investment in the continent. In November 
2009, it was the turn of the city of Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, to receive the IV 
FOCAC, where new loans were announced from China to Africa with very 
low interest rates, and it was also proposed to implement more than 100 pro-
jects in different sectors.
In July 2012, Beijing hosted the V FOCAC in which steps to increase 
progress in the strategic alliance were decided. In December 2015, Johan-
nesburg, South Africa hosted the VI FOCAC. These meetings have proved 
to be extremely important for the narrowing of Sino-African relations, allow-
ing platforms of dialogue and development in a “South-South” perspective 
(Mendes 2010).
China has been strengthening its partnership with African countries, 
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creating a huge field of opportunities involving mutually advantageous trade 
agreements, notably by granting loans to projects on the continent, triggering 
foreign direct investment and technical assistance (Hackenesch 2011).
After the end of Mao Zedong Era, China experienced a new phase in 
its history with the administration of Deng Xiaoping (1978-1992), founder of 
Market Socialism. Deng Xiaoping did not intend to expand Chinese ideology, 
as did the outgoing President, but to promote China’s economic development 
from the implementation of a new model. Recognizing the importance of 
Third World countries for their diplomacy, the People’s Republic of China 
turns its attention to them, aware of the possibility of diversifying their rela-
tions, seeking other opportunities for cooperation, not to rely only and exclu-
sively on developed countries (Taylor 2009).
In fact, it is important to emphasize that the main line of Chinese 
diplomacy becomes the engagement with these countries, considering that 
they may be important allies, since they share the same interests of Beijing 
(Rios 2005). In the meantime, China has made clear that its intention is not 
to dominate or exploit, but to establish cooperation based on peaceful coexist-
ence (Taylor 2006). The “dragon” sought to establish its cooperation with the 
outside world respecting five principles, which in its opinion are fundamental 
for a harmonious development, namely: [1] Non-intervention or interference 
in internal affairs; [2] The pact of mutual non-aggression; [3] Cooperation and 
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; [4] Equality and re-
ciprocal advantages; [5] Peaceful coexistence with other States (Hong-Ming 
2004).
With the implementation of the reforms promoted by Deng Xiaoping, 
China sought to consolidate its economy by investing promisingly in Sino-Af-
rican relations.
Jiang Zemin, President of China from 1993 to 2003, as Africa real-
ized, made it clear that there was a need to adopt a new development model 
that prioritized a stable and, above all, versatile relationship in the long term. 
In order to re-dimension the relationship with the African countries, Jiang 
Zemin proposed five guidelines for maintaining these bilateral and multilat-
eral relations as a way of cultivating the principle of solidarity, establishing 
friendships based on sincerity, cooperation and pool efforts for common de-
velopment (Anshan 2007).
China’s integration in 2001 into the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
has reopened the prospect of cooperation with African countries, thereby ac-
celerating China’s development process, making it one of the largest investors 
abroad (António, 2008). With the adoption of the Global Strategy program in 
2002 and, therefore, the internationalization of its private and public enter-
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prises, China has had positive overall results, creating a solid and necessary 
basis for consolidating relations with Africa.
Hu Jintao, President from 2003 to 2013, continued the Chinese policy 
of strong cooperation and solidarity with African countries. During his stay in 
power, he visited 17 African countries on four trips to the continent. In 2004, 
he visited Algeria, Egypt and Gabon; in 2006, Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya; 
in 2007, Cameroon, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Sudan and 
Zambia and in 2009 visited Mauritius, Mali, Senegal and Tanzania. The state 
visits and the other Forums held made clear the Chinese intention of not in-
terfering and/or intervening in the domestic politics of the African countries, 
nor pressing them to change their political regimes. Beijing intended to use 
economic and political cooperation rationally to advance the political and eco-
nomic agenda of the South, with a view of building a more just and equitable 
international order (Shelton 2006).
At the FOCAC meeting held in Beijing in July 2012, Jintao made it 
clear that, since China is one of the largest developing countries in the world 
and due to the fact that the African continent is the home of to the largest 
number of developing countries, the union and cooperation between the 
two would make sense as they account for a third of the world’s population. 
This cooperation demonstrates a plausible justification for the unleashing of 
peace and development, since both China and Africa share a common des-
tiny (Jintao 2012). Equality, sincerity, friendship and common development 
are the guiding principles of the relationship between the Chinese and the 
African (Jintao 2012). He added that China and Africa had decided to estab-
lish a new type of strategic partnership, with clear progress for both. China 
has also sought to strengthen its relationship within the African Union (AU) 
and other African regional organizations with the aim of implementing prac-
tical cooperation measures, proposing strategies to combat the international 
financial crisis (Jintao 2012).
China-Africa bilateral trade expanded, reaching US$166.3 billion in 
2011, three times more than in 2006. China’s accumulated direct investment 
in Africa exceeded US$15 billion. China’s assistance to Africa has grown ex-
ponentially, especially with the construction of more than 100 schools, 30 
hospitals, 30 anti-malaria centers and 20 agricultural technology demonstra-
tion centers (Jintao, 2012). China has honored its commitment by providing 
Africa with US$15 billion of preferential loans. In addition, China and Africa 
have increased exchanges between people and culture (Jintao 2012). Jintao 
undoubtedly sought to build a harmonized world, establishing as strategy the 
construction of a future international order (Gonçalves 2010).
The current Chinese President Xi Jinping, who took over the country 
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after Jintao’s resignation in 2013, made it clear that his intention is, above all, 
to establish and strengthen the relationship with Africa, reaching new heights 
of development. For Jinping, it is necessary to maintain high-level proximity 
exchanges, aware of the importance of strengthening the governance experi-
ence and increasing mutual support and understanding on issues of greatest 
concern to them. It is no accident that at FOCAC in 2015 the Chinese govern-
ment announced a US$60 billion financial support package in the following 
areas: preferential loans and export credit lines, subsidies, CAD Fund and 
development of African small and medium enterprises.
China has embarked on the creation of a platform called the New Silk 
Road Initiative or One Belt One Road to strengthen trade relations between 
countries with Central Asia, Russia and other regions of Europe, in this con-
text, Africa may also play a very important role. This project includes several 
works of infrastructure implemented such as the railway lines linking Tanza-
nia and Zambia, which will connect the cities of Nairobi and Mombasa and 
the one already opened between Addis Ababa in Kenya. The same occurred 
in Djibouti and Mauritania with the improvement and expansion of harbors 
and industrial parks.
China has certainly been backed by an internal development plan as 
set out in Agenda 2063. Because they expressed interest, China responded, 
at least rhetorically, in favor of the inclusion of African countries in the One 
Belt One Road initiative. As such, African countries need to provide adequate 
security to protect the investment environment. African governments will 
need to provide a favorable environment for projects to succeed, particularly 
as envisaged especially in the private sector, so that it can effectively play an 
important role in One Belt One Road (The Conversation 2017).
The Chinese Foreign Policy in the PALOP
 In the context of the Cold War, China was receptive to unleash dip-
lomatic, economic, technical and military support for the Liberation Move-
ments in Africa, allowing the affirmation and consolidation of the newly in-
dependent countries, especially those of the Portuguese Language like Angola 
and Mozambique. The Chinese Foreign Policy met the need to extend its in-
fluence on the African Continent, seeking to develop relations with the newly 
independent African Portuguese Speaking Countries (PALOP), truly forming 
a united front to fight against colonialism and imperialism, revolutionizing 
the world based on the dissemination of its ideology. To mark its presence on 
the continent, China began to establish direct relations with African countries 
(Visentini and Oliveira 2012).
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In order to explore the historical ties between Macao and the Commu-
nity of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), China has decided to make 
this Special Administrative Region a platform for community liaison, espe-
cially for African countries, whose goal is to deepen cooperation in different 
sectors, making the best use of the resources of each (Macao Special Admin-
istrative Region Government, 2003). This strategy is based on the principle 
One Country, Two Systems, with which China intends to join its special ad-
ministrative regions. This principle applies legally and institutionally in Ma-
cao and Hong Kong (Marchionatti 2012). Meanwhile, China’s priority is the 
reunification of its territory, particularly referring to Taiwan’s media case.
In strict observance of this principle, Macao has played an extremely 
important role in boosting institutional and trade relations between China 
and the PALOP countries, and in October 2003 it promoted the Forum for 
Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Countries of Lan-
guage (FCECCPLP), which was attended by government representatives from 
Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, China, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal 
and Timor-Leste (Government of the Macao Special Administrative Region 
2003). The Plan of Action for Economic and Trade Cooperation was approved 
at this first Ministerial Meeting, which highlighted the need to develop and 
strengthen economic, trade and investment relations between China and its 
community. Among other aspects discussed in this Plan, it was decided that, 
given the opportunities and challenges that the process of economic globali-
zation imposes, the shared values and the principles of trust, equality, reci-
procity, complementarity in trade, diversification of forms of cooperation and 
the sharing of interests should be considered (Macao Special Administrative 
Region Government 2003).
It was also decided that the Ministerial Meeting would be held every 
three years in order to deepen the relationship between the two. To date, four 
more Ministerial Conferences have been held, named the Macao Forum in 
September 2006, in November 2010, in November 2013 and in October 2016. 
These meetings were approved by the respective Action Plans that guide Chi-
na-CPLP cooperation and which stand out in the following areas: intergov-
ernmental cooperation, business, infrastructure, energy, natural resources, 
human, financial, agriculture, fisheries, livestock, education, tourism, trans-
port, communications, sports and health (Macao Special Administrative Re-
gion 2017).
Specially regarding the PALOP, it should be noted that China has tak-
en advantage of the fact that, many of these countries abound in natural and 
energy resources, to draw strategic partnerships to strengthen their econo-
mies, as well as to mitigate the problem of fragility in terms of bargaining 
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power. Angola and Mozambique occupy prime positions in this cooperation, 
with Angola following Russia as China’s second-largest oil supplier and one 
of the earliest recipients of Chinese foreign aid, often taken for granted. After 
the civil war in 2002, Angola sees its relationship with China strengthened 
and consolidated since 2004 with the signing of several agreements, with 
which the Chinese Government pledged to cede funds to finance dozens of 
projects in different areas, from technological development, infrastructure 
and agriculture, education, health, transportation and communications. 
From 2000 to 2013, the Chinese government funded more than 60 projects 
in Angola (AidData 2017).
 As far as bilateral economic and trade relations are concerned, as in 
the case of Chinese investment, Angola ranks first among PALOPs. Among 
the traditional partners in Angola such as Portugal, Brazil and Russia, China 
occupies a prominent position.
The other PALOP countries such as Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Mozambique have also received special attention from 
China as it has sought to strengthen and diversify partnerships with these 
countries in the field of trade and investment, focusing mainly on the areas 
of infrastructure, agriculture, blue economy and fisheries sector, mining, hu-
man resources and energy. The China-Mozambique relationship goes back 
to the liberation struggle, when Mozambique, through the Liberation Front 
of Mozambique (FRELIMO), under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane, re-
ceived diplomatic and military aid from China within the framework of the 
strategy aimed at avoiding its involvement in the ideological division (Tay-
lor 2006). The relationship between China and Mozambique has intensified 
over time. Mozambique ranks among the five largest African timber export-
ers to China (Chichava 2008). This is, in turn, the largest investor in Mozam-
bique following the neighboring country of South Africa (Macao Promotion 
and Investment Institute, 2015). In the first half of 2016, China was the most 
invested in Mozambique, with US$ 154 million, accounting for 60% of total 
foreign direct investment, far surpassing South Africa, with only US$ 45 mil-
lion (Macaohub 2016).
The relationship between China and the PALOP has been one of 
growth, diversification and consolidation because, on the one hand, they are 
linked by a historical heritage and cultural legacy and, on the other hand, they 
share a common vision for development. China sees in PALOP an important 
means of security regarding the exploitation of energy and other natural re-
sources, as well as the exploitation of a market that could reach millions of 
consumers. Compared with Western partners, the implementation of China’s 
investment projects in the PALOPs has been carried out without the need for 
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political reforms and compliance with international standards in the areas of 
human rights, labor and the environment, relations are solely and exclusively 
aimed at promoting economic and trade cooperation.
China-Cape Verde Cooperation: The Place of the Archipelago 
in the Sino-African Relationship
 Located in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean between Africa, Europe 
and the Americas, roughly 500 km off the African west coast, off Senegal, 
Cape Verde is located between the parallels 17º 12 ‘and 14º 48’ N and the 
meridians 22º 41 ‘and 25º 22’ West of Greenwich. It is characterized by be-
ing a small island State composed of ten islands and several islets of volcanic 
origin that form a geographic area with a total area of  4030 km2, occupied by 
approximately 539 thousand inhabitants (World Bank 2017).
As it is an archipelago with scarce natural resources, promoting its 
development entails increased costs for the State, making it dependent on 
external flows, including remittances from migrants, investments in the tour-
ism sector and aid programs to development. It is in this context that this 
country’s relationship with China has been of vital importance and is cur-
rently one of the most important partners in the countries of the Southern 
Hemisphere. China has a long-standing relationship with the archipelago, 
which has sought to meet these challenges through a diversified diplomacy 
that has sought new development perspectives and strategies for mobilizing 
external resources.
Conscious of its limitations, Cape Verde has sought to implement 
partnerships that value its island specificities, particularly its privileged ge-
ostrategic position in the Atlantic. In fact, it is one of the vocations that the 
archipelago has explored since its discovery between 1460 and 1462 and that 
served for centuries as a turntable function of the transatlantic trade.
Through an armed struggle, Cape Verde won its sovereignty in 1975, 
in athe context of a Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde unity project, creating 
conditions to become viable as a nation-state. This historic milestone allowed 
international recognition and respect, allowing it to be included in interna-
tional organizations (UN), specialized institutions (ILO), political-diplomatic 
concertation organizations, social, cultural, economic, (CPLP), regional (AU) 
and subregional (ECOWAS) organizations, as well as in financial and eco-
nomic international organizations (IMF, World Bank and WTO).
In April 1976, one year after independence, Cape Verde formalized its 
diplomatic relations with China, that was one of the first countries to estab-
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lish an Embassy in Cape Verde, based in the city of Praia, island of Santiago. 
Although Cape Verde established a Consulate General in Hong Kong that 
represented it in Asian diplomacy, it only formally established an embassy in 
Beijing in 2001, and in 2005 appointed the first Ambassador to China, Diplo-
mat Dr. Júlio César Morais.
Although Cape Verde has one of the best rankings (122nd) on the 
Human Development Index (HDI) between the PALOP and the countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, it is at the bottom of the list of priorities of the Chinese 
Foreign Policy, due to its limited market and lack of natural and energetic re-
sources that have motivated much of China’s interests in the continent. Thus, 
the question is what are the real interests of China in Cape Verde? It is nec-
essary to understand that Cape Verde is at the political, economic and social 
level one of the most stable countries of the continent and that it cultivates a 
policy of peace with reflections in its political system that is complemented 
with a privileged geostrategic position in the Atlantic, especially in the Exclu-
sive Economic Zone (EEZ), being the thirty-sixth largest in the world. Because 
it occupies a geopolitical space that favors it between the Atlantic shores, the 
archipelago ends up generating attraction and arousing interest in the estab-
lishment of different partnerships (Madeira 2016; Amante da Rosa 2007).
The country has sought to find the means to face the structural chal-
lenges. Therefore, it has been focusing on strategic sectors such as service 
provision, industrialization, the blue economy and tourism, which have mar-
gins of growth, allowing gradually achieving the long-awaited sustainable de-
velopment. Despite the structural constraints such as geographical disconti-
nuity, cyclical droughts, scarce population and precarious natural resources, 
successive governments in Cape Verde have succeeded in building a dem-
ocratic state with the support and solidarity of their development partners, 
eliminating underdevelopment with a view to build a promising and sustain-
able society (Morais 2015).
In fact, since the independence of Cape Verde, the foreign aid grant-
ed to Cape Verde in the granting of grants and concessional loans has had 
structuring macroeconomic effects. The archipelago has been prioritizing the 
intensification of its relationship with China, focusing on programs, projects 
and actions in strategic areas demarcated in the transformation agenda of 
the country. These initiatives are aimed at transforming Cape Verde into a 
secure and competitive service platform in the Middle Atlantic, close to major 
African markets and the main sources of raw materials considered strategic 
(Morais 2015). It is no coincidence that several documents have been signed 
which contemplate a number of strategic projects, with which Cape Verde 
hopes, of course, to create the conditions to project the partnership with Chi-
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na to new heights (Morais 2015).
With the establishment of the Macao Forum in October 2003, bilat-
eral relations between China and Cape Verde have seen significant progress, 
intensifying contacts in economic, cultural and technical-institutional cooper-
ation. In fact, Cape Verde has hosted three Entrepreneurs’ Meetings for Eco-
nomic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking 
Countries in the city of Praia, on the island of Santiago. The first in 2008, the 
second in 2012 and the third in June 2017 that had as its central theme the 
Promotion of Opportunities for Economic Cooperation between China and 
the Portuguese-speaking Countries. It should be noted that Macao Special Ad-
ministrative Region (Macao SAR) has served as a platform for the rapproche-
ment and dissemination of Cape Verde in the Pearl River Delta (Morais 2015).
The contribution of the Macao SAR is relevant, since it made Cape 
Verde a known country, because until the recent past, China was unaware of 
the size and location of the archipelago (Morais 2015). It is noteworthy that, 
following the formal signing in 1976 of the Cape Verde-China bilateral rela-
tionship, substantial improvements have been achieved, with the subsequent 
signing of several legal agreements, including the following:
In 1977, the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement; in 
1982, the Cultural Cooperation Agreement; in 1998, the Agreement for the 
Promotion and Protection of Reciprocal Investments; in 1999, the Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement; in 2005, the Cape Verde-Macao Visa Sup-
pression Agreement; in 2007, the General Agreement on Cooperation in the 
Defense Sector; in 2008, the Framework Agreement on Concession Loan 
Concession; in 2009 Agreement of Joint Commission of Economic, Com-
mercial and Technical Cooperation and the Agreement of Cooperation in 
the Area of  Historical Heritage; in 2010 the Cape Verde-Macao SAR Services 
Agreement and the Macao Convention on the Avoidance of Double Taxation; 
in 2013 the Agreement of Legal-Judicial Cooperation Cape Verde-MSAR; in 
2014 the Suppression of Visas in Diplomatic Passports and Service Passports; 
in 2015 the Agreement Establishing a Mechanism for Political and Diplomat-
ic Consultations and in 2016 the Cooperation Agreement for the Implemen-
tation of the “Safe Cities” Project.
In addition to these agreements, other initiatives to leverage the com-
mercial relationship and cultural exchange between the two countries, such 
as donations and concessional credit lines, protocols and projects, stand out. 
China has financed several projects in Cape Verde, including: cement plant 
in the municipality of Santa Cruz, loan agreements for social housing pro-
jects, E-GOV II - Electronic Governance project, through the installation of 
local network in schools, public institutions and hospitals, the Technological 
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Center of Cape Verde. In July 2017, it was announced the construction of 
the new Campus of University of Cape Verde, with sixty-one classroom that 
allows to welcome 4,890 students. The new University Campus will have 
five auditoriums, thirty-four laboratories, eight computer rooms, eight read-
ing rooms, a library, cafeterias, a sports hall and a multipurpose space with a 
capacity of 654 seats.
In 2015, the Government of Cape Verde signed an agreement for the 
construction of a Resort in the City of Praia by Macao Legend Development 
Ltd., headed by Macao’s David Chow. The Cape Verde Integrated Resort & 
Casino project, which is estimated at around 250 million euros, is one of the 
largest ever in Cape Verde with a direct impact on the national economy. For 
David Chow, this project proves to be of extreme importance in two senses. 
Firstly, it is to be welcomed that a local company, in this case Macao Legend 
Development Ltd., has taken advantage of the role that Macao has played as a 
platform in the connection between China and the CPLP countries; Secondly, 
in coordination with One Belt, One Road Chinese policy, the MSAR has as-
sumed an important position as one of the cities of the Maritime Silk Road, 
allowing local small and medium-sized enterprises to develop cooperation 
with external partners (Macao Tribuna Journal 2015).
In addition, David Chow as the President of the Legend Globe Invest-
ment Company, signed with the Cape Verdean Ambassador in Beijing, Dr. Ta-
nia Romualdo, on behalf of the Government of Cape Verde, a memorandum 
of understanding to open a credit institution in Cape Verde called the Sino-At-
lantic Bank, considering that the financial sector has been strategic for the 
economic development of the archipelago. These investments demonstrate 
the role that Chinese entrepreneurs play in China’s growing involvement 
with Cape Verde and, in general, with Portuguese-speaking African countries. 
China has provided conditions for its companies to find the necessary stabil-
ity in the archipelago, using it as a strategic point to reach other expanding 
regional markets.
Since the 1990s, a significant number of small Chinese investors have 
come to Cape Verde, that have opened businesses in the sector of the com-
mercialization of clothing and other accessories. Over time, there has been a 
substantial increase in these types of activity and, as a result, the Chinese have 
begun to diversify their businesses, particularly in the wholesale and retail 
trade in food, construction, auto parts, car rental, maintenance and repair 
of motorcycles, mechanics, carpentry, locksmithing, grinding and aluminum 
industry.
In addition, it is worth mentioning several initiatives that have en-
couraged the rapprochement and exchange between the archipelago and the 
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People’s Republic of China. The Cape Verde-China Friendship Association 
(AMICACHI) was created in 2011 and is characterized by a Cape Verdean 
non-governmental organization whose aim is to strengthen ties of friendship 
and cultural exchange between Cape Verde and China. Between 2011 and 
2012 the University of Cape Verde formalizes partnerships with the Chinese 
provincial universities, reinforcing cooperation in the field of human resourc-
es training and professional training.
The construction of educational establishments, as well as the con-
siderable increase in scholarships for Cape Verdean students who wish to 
pursue and continue their higher education in Chinese universities, demon-
strate China’s commitment to co-ordinate with the Cape Verdean government 
towards the education sector. In 2015, the University of Cape Verde signed a 
Protocol for the installation of the Confucius Institute in Cape Verde, one of 
the first in the country, to encourage the promotion of Chinese language and 
culture with the University of Foreign Studies in Guangzhou.
The Ministry of Education and the Confucius Institute of the Uni-
versity of Cape Verde signed a cooperation protocol in 2017 to introduce the 
Mandarin Language in the 2017/2018 academic year as an optional foreign 
language in the Cape Verdean Teaching System, in order to build opportuni-
ties and thus allow for greater cultural approximation.
Cape Verdean government officials have sought to make clear that 
the archipelago’s intention is to maximize and strengthen the relationship 
with China. Therefore, in 2004, 2006 and 2012 the former Prime Minister of 
Cape Verde, José Maria Neves, made several official visits to China. Between 
2007 and 2010, it was the turn of the former President of the Republic of 
Cape Verde, Pedro Pires. Cape Verde, for its part, received the official visit of 
Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan in 2009.
Cape Verde, in its relationship with China, presents itself strategically 
as a country with high geopolitical value that distinguishes itself from other 
spaces, making possible the geographical approximation to important geopo-
litical and geo-economic zones, particularly in the African continent (Madeira 
2015). Taking advantage of its position within regional and international or-
ganizations, Cape Verde should enable the expression of a new internation-
al identity, aware that it will survive being useful in the global context. The 
archipelago, as a country that tends to need more aid than it can effectively 
offer, needs to cooperate and interact with other states in order to overcome 
its structural weaknesses that hinder its development.
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Final Notes
 By prioritizing cooperation outside the traditional North-South axis, 
the Chinese government sought to make room for the development of large 
investments in infrastructure projects and production resources through 
agreements between African national governments and Chinese state-owned 
enterprises. China had as its fundamental intention to establish a strategy, 
which in its view could be called “win-win” or mutually beneficial relations, 
respecting sovereignty and non-interference (Zhao 2004).
Both China and Africa have a vested interest in consolidating this rela-
tionship, for China, the African continent is in favor of the natural resources 
exploitation as well as strategic opportunities for trade expansion, develop-
ment and diversification in regional markets. Africa, on the other hand, sees 
in the “dragon” the opportunity to obtain financing and support funds for its 
development and the reinforcement of its political weight in the international 
panorama. Although the African continent is not the main priority of Chinese 
diplomacy, it has in practice increasingly attracted the attention of succes-
sive Chinese governments, considering that it is important to assert common 
commercial and political interests in order to stimulate the development.
The Portuguese-speaking African Countries (PALOP), in the frame-
work of Sino-African cooperation, have received special attention, due, on the 
one hand, to the cultural and historical links between them, since the Macao 
Special Administrative Region was administered by Portugal, during approx-
imately four centuries, being part of the Community of Portuguese Speaking 
Countries (CPLP), and, on the other, for the opportunities that PALOP offer 
commercial and investment.
Cape Verde’s remarkable path since its independence in the PALOPs 
has attracted interest from international institutions and organizations, as 
well as from world powers, who have sought out the archipelago in order 
to deepen and strengthen relations and cooperation in various fields. Chi-
na has undoubtedly been one of the partners that has contributed the most 
to the archipelago gaining confidence in its potential, despite the territori-
al scarcity and insularity that have made socio-economic development more 
unbalanced. It is considered fundamentally necessary to establish strategic 
alliances and cooperation with other States, institutions and regional and in-
ternational organizations, so that Cape Verde can overcome the geoeconomic 
deficit by being open to the foreign market, thus strengthening the role of 
facilitator in international trade with a focus on sectors such as tourism, blue 
economy, agriculture, fisheries, industry and service provision.
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Cape Verde’s geo-strategic position is a potential, since it allows it to 
play a key role in the North and South Atlantic, particularly regarding its im-
portance as an intercontinental link of political, commercial, economic, finan-
cial and economic relations. cultural activities.
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ABSTRACT
This article analyses the main issues raised by the cooperation between China and 
Africa. Particularly, it focuses on the guidelines of the Cape Verde-China relationship 
that is in itself a durable and multidimensional one. To achieve these objectives, it is 
necessary to adopt an interdisciplinary methodology, prioritizing the cross-reference 
data obtained from bibliographical and documentary research, allowing a critical re-
flection. Although Cape Verde enjoys political stability, which is complemented by 
a climate of legal and institutional security, it is believed that China’s interest in the 
archipelago is mainly economic and commercial, as it serves as a logistics platform 
in the African region.
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